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INTRODUCTION
As part of its overall Uranium Enrichment Support (UES) Project, the Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked Lawrence Liverrnore National Laboratory to provide nuclear criticality safety (NCS) support to the gaseous diffusion plants (GDP), operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems (MMES), near Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. One requirement of this GDP NCS Task, as defined by MMES, is a criticality evaluation of the Decontamination and Uranium Recovery Facility, X-705, at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS).
This report is the first in a series of documents that will evaluate nuclear " criticality safety in X-705. Its primary purposes are to: (1) provide an overview of the facility, (2) categorize the facility operations and equipment for future analysis, (3) review the existing NCS documentation relative to X-705, and (4) explain the follow-on effort.
Sect;on 2.0 of this report provides a general description of X-705 and discusses a functional breakdown of its systems, subsystems, and operational areas. Section 3.0 summarizes the various types of MMES NCS documentation, with specific details on those relative to X-705, and correlates these numerous NCS documents with the systems, subsystems, and operational areas. An overview of the future effort planned for the X-705 assessment is then presented in Section 4.0.
The information on systems, subsystems, and operational areas presented in this report was current as of September 1992.
X-705 FACILITY

Description
The X-705 buildingis a permanentstructure, approximately520 feet by 160 feet, with a concrete slab floor, concrete and transite walls, and steel support columns. Steel trusses support a metal roof deck, covered by insulation and roofing. The buildingis sited in the northernpart of the plant and centrallylocatedwith respect to the X-326, X-330, and X-333 processbuildings. X-705 is managed by the Chemical OperationsDepartment, Uranium ProductionSubdivision.
"
The primarypurposeof the X-705 facilityisto decontaminateprocessequipment from the uranium enrichment cascade prior to maintenance, modification,or other disposition. Other uranium-contaminated items, such as heeled uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and chemical trap material, are also processed in X-705.
The procedures used to decontaminate equipment produce a significant quantity of uranium-bearing solutions.
Solutions with high uranium concentration are processed in X-705 to recover the uranium (in oxide form) for potential future use and to remove other unacceptable materials before the effluents are released to the environment. Solutions with low uranium content are also treated to remove uranium, which is collected in waste storage drums.
Until 1978 the recovered uranium (U308) was further converted to UF6 in X-705 so that it could be reintroduced into the cascade. Environmental concerns resulted in the discontinuance of that process, and the oxide is now simply stored in other plant facilities. No program appears to exist to consider restart of the oxide conversion process.
Finally, in order to perform the above functions of decontamination, uranium J recovery, and water treatment, a number of support services are required. These include, for example, utility services, maintenance capability, laboratory analyses, and administrative support. In general, the major support services required in X-705 are -located within the building itself.
Systems
As discussed in Section 2.1, X-705 is a large facility housing numerous activities and support services. In order to perform an NCS evaluation of the entire facility, it is first necessary to divide X-705 into logical categories of related activities that can be analyzed individually. These individual activities can then be consolidated, with particular attention to their interfaces, in order to achieve an overall NCS evaluation.
For this study, X-705 has been divided into five top-level systems based on general functional area:
(1) Decontamination (2) Uranium Recovery (3) Oxide Conversion (4) Waste Water Treatment (5) Support Services This breakdown is shown schematically in Fig. 2 .1. The reader should note the direct correspondence between these functions and the description of X-705 discussed in ' Section 2.1.
t_
Other criteria, besides functional area, could have been chosen as the basis for breakdown. These include, but certainly are not limited to, location within the building, input stream, output stream, etc. Because the selection of functional area obviously impacts the remainder of the study, it is probably worthwhile to discuss briefly the rationale for its selection. First, it provides a very logical relationship between the various activities and enables a methodical description of the work flow within the facility. It correlates very well with X-705 supervisory responsibilities and reasonably well (but not exactly) with the physical layout of the building. Finally, as will be seen in Section 3.0, it corresponds in general to previous breakdowns used for preparing documentation relative to X-705. Each of these top-level systems will next be described in more detail.
Subsystems and Operational Areas
Each of the five top-level systems described above can be further divided into activities or groups of activities. For the purposes of this study the level of breakdown below the system will often be referred to as subsystems (SS). In many cases it is advantageous to divide these subsystems further into operational areas (OA). This section provides a more-detailed description of X-705 and the relationship among the -systems, subsystems, and operational areas. (1) Systems, subsystems, or operational areas that are no longer operational are indicated with -italics.
(2) A category of "General Storage and Handling" has been added to various systems and subsystems to include activities that are difficult to assign specifically to a given area. 
,
Highly concentrated solutions are processed in X-705 to recover the uranium (in oxide form) for potential future use and to remove other unacceptable materials before the effluents are retdrned to the environment. Most of this uranium recovery operation " takes place in "B" area, the ground floor/mezzanine shown in Fig. 2 .2, although initial treatment may begin in the small parts ("A") area.
Many discarded laboratory solutions contain acids (other than nitric), which for various reasons should not be processed through normal recovery hardware. Although mixed acids precipitation was previously performed in "B" area [SS2.14], these procedures have been discontinued. Current plans envision the use of the minimicrofiltration system (once used for cylinder wash solutions) in "A" area [SS2.1]; however, the exact procedures have yet to be refined and implemented.
Another recovery operation beginning in "A" area is trap material leaching Various uranium-bearing solids and solutions that may contain fluoride ions are treated in the fluorides-complexing handtable [SS2.3] in "A" area to reduce corrosion in the stainless steel plumbing throughout the recovery process. These solutions and other uranyl nitrate solutions that have been collected in polybottles are taken to the recovery/blending handtable [SS2.4] in "B" area.
"
Solutions from both the recovery/blending handtable and the unmeasured storage (leaching operation and contaminated acids from spray booth) are pumped to the B-36/B-38 storage columns [SS2.5], where they can be properly mixed and their volume, concentration, and assay accurately determined before transfer to the B-1 measured storage columns or measured tunnel storage.
Continued processing of the uranium solutions can be performed in any of three (A, B, or C) essentially identical loops [SS2.6], in which the solution is separated into a product (uranium-bearing) and waste (uranium-depleted) stream. The concentrated product stream proceeds through a calciner [SS2.7] . Here the uranyl nitrate is converted to oxide (U308), which is collected in 5-in. cans for storage. Gases produced from the calcining process are scrubbed to remove nitrogen oxides [SS2.8]. 
•
The oxide conversion processes in "E/F/H" areas are generally not operational. A glove box in "F" area is occasionally used, and the areas are available for general storage [SS3.2]. The calciner in "F" area that was previously used for uranium nitrate compounds [SS3.1] is no longer functional, although still in place.
_,:_.4 Waste Water Treatment System [$4.0]
The decontamination and recovery operations produce various slightly contaminated solutions for which the uranium is not economically recoverable, but, nevertheless, must be removed before the solution can be discharged to the environment. During the volume reduction process of uranium recovery, low uraniumconcentration condensate [SS4.1] is produced by the vapor separator/condenser segment of both the pre-and post-evaporators. Rinse-water solutions from spray-9 The slightly contaminated solutions are collected in a 7000-gal. overhead storage unit [SS4.5] . This unit consists of 14 stainless steel pipes (5-in diameter), which traverse north-south along most of the length of the high bay. Uranium removal is accomplished by the microfiltration/pressure filtration subsystem [SS4.6]. The sludge produced from the concentrate of this process is batched into 55-gal drums; the permeate is transferred to the effluent pumping station [SS4.7], before discharge from X-705.
The final and distinct subsystem of waste water treatment is the tunnel sumps _, [SS4.8] . These sumps are located in the north and south ends of the basement of the spray booth tunnel. Ground water that accumulates in these sumps is slightly contaminated with non-uranium compounds and cannot be discharged directly to the environment.
This water is pumped to truck-mounted water tanks for transport to additional processing facilities. [$5.0] This system consists of all the functions needed to provide general support for the operations in X-705. The maintenance shop [SS5.1] in "D" area contains all tools necessary for disassembly and selected rebuilding of process equipment. The primary purpose of the "G"-area laboratory [SS5.2] is to determine uranium concentrations of solutions. Uranium assays (percent enrichment) are performed by personnel from Applied Nuclear Technology (ANT 
Support Services System
EXISTING NCS DOCUMENTATION
During the approximately 40 years of PORTS operation an extensive amount of NCS documentationhas been published. This sectionpresentsa general overviewof the varioustypes of NCS documentsand providesmore detailed informationon those specificto X-705.
Final Safety Analysis Report and Operational Safety Requirements
The top-level safety-related PORTS document is the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSA,_) i, a three-volume report originally published in 1985. Volume 1 ' provides an introduction to the plant, general site information, and a summary safety analysis. Volume 2 describes detailed operations of the entire plant, and Volume 3 _, discusses accident scenarios and analyses.
The majority of the information in the FSAR relative to X-705 is contained in Section 4.3 (Volume 2) and Section 5.3 (Volume 3). Although the FSAR has been updated several times since first published, a number of X-705 operations appear to be no longer accurately documented, and a significant revision of the FSAR is presently in progress. Appendix A is a detailed listing of the systems, subsystems, and operational areas in X-705 and the respective sections in which they are discussed in the FSAR. Those areas presented in the FSAR but no longer operational are indicated in italics.
Another top-level document mandated by DOE is the Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs), reported in GAT/GDP-1074. (DOE Order 5480.22 now prescribes Technical Safety Requirements, rather than OSRs.) Part H (Rev. 3) of GAT/GDP-1074 contains safety limits, limiting conditions for operations, surveillance requirements, design batures, and administrative controls for X-705. This information is cross-referenced to the X-705 systems, subsystems, and operational areas in • Appendix B.
The OSRs for X-705 are similar, but not identical, to information contained in -Section 4.3.2.2 of the FSAR. The rationale for the differences is not clear.
Development Memos and Reports
Development Memos (DMs) were initiated in 1954 by the Development Subdivision in order to transmit functional information directly to individuals concerned. Development Reports were similar in purpose to DMs but were reserved for the results of a study or investigation and were addressed only to the manager of Development Engineering. Both of these types of documents were initially rather informal in nature2.
Over the years, however, these procedures have evolved into a much more formal reporting system, which now consists of Development Memos and T-Reports. Sometimes the DMs for a particular facility or building have been consolidated into a single DM, whose length can exceed 100 pages. Whethel" or not a topic is covered in a DM or T-Report has varied in recent years. Although these documents contain very authoritative language (e.g., "ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN"), they apparently serve only as a guide for the operating department3.
During the early 1960s the various DMs pertaining to X-705 were consolidated into DM-868. The most current revision, Rev. 4, was published in 1984 and incorporated all previous DMs, T-Reports., and FCAs (see next section) pertaining to " X-705. (One addendum to DM-868 was published in 1985, but this was later superseded by FCA-382, as discussed in the next section.) Over the past seven • years, however, a number of additional DMs and a few T-Reports concerning the operations in X-705 have been separately published. Appendix C cross-references pages of DM-868, other DMs, and T-Reports to the appropriate systems, subsystems, and operational areas of X-705.
DM-868 is obviously not current. Major hardware/equipment changes have occurred since the document was last revised, and many of the activities discussed are either no longer performed or are performed in a manner different from that described. Overall, the document is rather confusing. The breakout by functional area is not obvious without reference to the Table of Contents, which unfortunately does not include page numbers. The format of the discussions is not consistent, probably the result of their being written over a several-decade time frame. DM-868 also contains numerous errors, some that appear substantive as well as typographical. References to figures by number are often inaccurate.
No plans exist to revise DM-868. Instead, a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) will be prepared on each operational area in X-705. The follow-on effort by • LLNL, discussed in Section 4.0, should be the basis for many of these NCSAs.
Field Agreements and Facility Change Agreements
Field Agreements (FAs) and Facility Change Agreements (FCAs) are formal interim agreements, signed by all parties involved, concerning safe operating practices3. FAs are more temporary, with lifetimes that have typically varied from a few weeks to a few months. FCAs define the NCS aspects of more permanent operations. Some FCAs (e.g., FCA-272 and FCA-273) appear to have been initially written as FAs.
With their formality and signature requirements, FCAs appear to be very authoritative in nature. They explicitly state actions that will or will not be performed. In the past, however, FCAs have often been canceled after being incorporated into the next revision of the applicable DM. Since DMs now appear to be guides, it could be argued that the actions required by these FCAs are no longer mandatory. The use of NCSAs, discussed above, should clarify this situation.
Since the last revision of DM-868, at least 67 FCAs have been implemented for X-705, and 53 of these are still active. (A total of 50 FCAs specific to X-705 were identified; two other FCAs pertaining to vacuum cleaners and one on UF6 cylinders are included in the 53.) Determining which FCAs are applicable to X-705 and which have not been canceled or superseded is not a straightforward task. Some FCAs that pertain to other facilities also contain information relevant to X-705 operations. For example, FCA-523, which permits the on-site use of 48X (10-ton) cylinders for 5% enrichment, is indexed under X-326 and X-333. This practice, however, definitely " impacts Large Cylinder Cleaning [OA1. 
Operating Methods
Each of the specific operations performed in a PORTS facility is generally covered in an Operating Method (OM). Recently, the nomenclature for these documents has been changed to In-Hand Procedures (IPs), Reference Procedures • (RPs), and other types of Procedures, depending on their intended use. As Operating Methods are revised, the designation of OM will gradually disappear.
"
OMs and IPs are very detailed, usually step-by-step, instructions designed to instruct operations personnel on the actual procedures for a given activity. New IPs and final revisions to existing OMs and IPs are approved by the Operations Committee, although interim (red-line) changes can be instituted unilaterally by line management. For ease in identification, interim changes are now printed on yellow paper, final revisions on blue paper.
A list of the OMs and IPs for X-705, referenced to the applicable system, subsystem, or operational area, is shown in Appendix E. Because a significant effort is now under way to update OMs and modify their numbering procedure, only the basic OM number is indicated in each case. Future analyses of the individual areas will provide the actual revision, changes, and addenda in effect at that time.
FUTURE EFFORT
As discussedin earlier sections,the NCS documentationfor X-705 is extensive.
Over the years an impressiveeffort has been devoted to'analysis of criticalitysafety. The fact that X-705 has operated safely for almost 40 years is a tribute to both the operational personnel anu NCS staff. As operational procedures change and new equipment is introduced,however, it eventually becomes prudent to reevaluate the overallfacilityfrom a bottoms-upbasis. Suchis the task forthis futureeffort.
Detailed NCS Evaluations
• A detailed NCS evaluationwill be performedfor all subsystemsand operational areas identified (in priority)by MMES. A report on each of these areas will includea more detailed description of the operations performed, the equipment in the area, and input/output fissile streams. Specific attention will be devoted to interfaces among the subsystems and operational areas.
The evaluation will be performed in general accordance with the ANSI series 8 requirements, and in particular with ANSI 8.14 (as modified by current DOE orders). This analysis will be fully documented and will address control parameters, safety systems, and administrative controls. Both normal and off-normal (including accident) events will be examined, and a specific assessment of the double contingency principle will be provided.
Documentation Listing
Each evaluation will be accompanied by a complete listing of applicable documentation. This listing will include all current NCS documentation for the specific subsystem or operational area under review and any other safety-related documents deemed appropriate by LLNL or MMES.
Update of Subsystems, Operational Areas, and Documentation
As discussed earlier, one of the primary purposes of this report is to serve as a starting point and road map for future evaluations. The breakdown of X-705 into subsystems and operational areas (and cross-referencing with NCS documentation) presented in previous sections of this report was performed after a summary review of existing documentation and initial discussions with MMES NCS and operational personnel. Because of the large number of significant changes that have occurred in X-705 since some of the documentation was published, it was often difficult to determine if specific documentation is still applicable and, if so, to which (muchchanged) operational area. Obviously, no totally accurate breakdown can be comPleted until the individual subsystems and operational areas are evaluated and all existing documentation examined in detail. During these detailed evaluations it is envisioned that the X-705 breakdown (especially interfaces) will be refined and 14 additional documentation identified. It is therefore anticipated that the information presented in this initial report will also need to be modified and the document revised in some manner before the overall task is completed. ..**._*****oo**ooo:**.****.**o**,o.oo._..`°°°***`**`°*`°***`****`°°°******-*****°°`*`**°***°`**_`_**°``**°******`*`*`**`..*o*.****.*-,*_*-****.*-*_***_**o******* **.******..oo******_...***_-**.oo***o-**** ..... 
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